Can ICSID Awards Be Assigned? The U.S. Decision and the Contrasting UK Position Cross-Border Legal Practice · International Arbitration Series Can ICSID Awards Be Assigned? The U.S. Decision and the Contrasting UK Position Blasket v. Spain and OperaFund v. Spain: contrasting approaches to the enforcement of assigned ICSID awards in the United States and England and Wales. ICSID ConventionArticle 54(2)Award AssignmentEnforcementBlasket / OperaFund Can an investor assign the benefit of an ICSID award, and may the assignee seek recognition and enforcement in its own name? On 30 September 2026, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, in Blasket Renewable Investments LLC v. Kingdom of Spain (No. 25-cv-1756), held that Article 54(2) of the ICSID Convention does not preclude an assignee from seeking enforcement of a validly assigned award. The judgment of the Court of Appeal of England and Wales in OperaFund Eco-Invest v. Spain, delivered on 2 November 2026, reached a different conclusion in proceedings concerning Blasket’s proposed substitution for the original award creditors. The decisions concern the same OperaFund/Schwab award and assignee, but arose in different procedural settings. 1. Background: from Spanish renewable-energy incentives to U.S. enforcementPROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Beginning in 1997, Spain enacted legislation offering financial incentives for renewable-energy investment. According to the U.S. Memorandum Opinion, legislation adopted between 2012 and 2017 reduced and ultimately withdrew incentives on which the relevant investors had relied. The resulting disputes led to ICSID arbitrations under the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). (U.S. Memorandum Opinion, pp. 3–4.) The U.S. proceedings concerned three ICSID awards in favour of OperaFund/Schwab, STEAG and Renergy. The principal damages awards were approximately EUR 29.30 million, EUR 27.675 million and EUR 32.896 million, respectively—approximately EUR 89.87 million in total, excluding interest and additional costs or amounts awarded in related decisions. The original award creditors subsequently assigned their rights under the awards to Blasket Renewable Investments LLC (Blasket). Blasket petitioned the District Court to enforce the awards on 3 June 2025. (U.S. Memorandum Opinion, pp. 4–8.) On 12 December 2025, Spain moved to dismiss Blasket’s petition under Rules 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or, alternatively, to stay the case. On 29 June 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court denied Spain’s petition for a writ of certiorari in related litigation (No. 24-1130). On 30 September 2026, Judge Randolph D. Moss issued a Memorandum Opinion rejecting Spain’s motion and stating that the Court would enter judgment for Blasket in the amounts and currencies specified in the awards. The Opinion stated that a separate order would issue. (U.S. Memorandum Opinion, pp. 8, 28–29; Supreme Court docket No. 24-1130.) 2. The U.S. court’s analysis of Spain’s objectionsMEMORANDUM OPINION · 30 SEPTEMBER 2026 2.1 Can an assignee seek enforcement under Article 54(2) and Rule 17? Spain contended that a party seeking recognition or enforcement in Article 54(2) referred exclusively to a party to the underlying ICSID arbitration. Since Blasket had not participated in those arbitrations, Spain argued that it could neither enforce the awards nor rely on the ICSID Convention and its U.S. implementing legislation to establish federal jurisdiction. Judge Moss rejected Spain’s construction. Article 54(2) requires a person seeking recognition or enforcement to furnish a copy of the award certified by the ICSID Secretary-General; the provision does not expressly confine that person to an original party to the arbitration. Looking at the Convention’s context-dependent use of party, and drawing on Blue Ridge Investments, LLC v. Republic of Argentina, the Court held that the Convention does not bar an assignee from enforcing a validly assigned ICSID award. The Court then addressed the jurisdictional and procedural consequences of that conclusion. (U.S. Memorandum Opinion, pp. 11–14.) Subject-matter jurisdiction: 22 U.S.C. §1650a(b) gives federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction over proceedings to enforce ICSID awards; Spain’s objection based on non-assignability failed. The Court also noted the FSIA arbitration exception and controlling D.C. Circuit precedent in NextEra. Personal jurisdiction: Spain challenged personal jurisdiction only insofar as subject-matter jurisdiction was absent, so that argument failed as well. Real party in interest: As assignee of all three awards, Blasket was the real party in interest and a proper plaintiff under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17. CORE HOLDINGArticle 54(2) does not preclude enforcement by the assignee of a validly assigned ICSID award. In this case, Blasket was the real party in interest under Rule 17. (Memorandum Opinion, pp. 12–14.) 2.2 Full faith and credit: can EU-law objections reopen the awards? Article 54(1) of the ICSID Convention obliges Contracting States to recognise awards as binding and enforce their pecuniary obligations. In the United States, 22 U.S.C. §1650a(a) directs that those obligations be enforced with the same full faith and credit as if the award were a final judgment of a state court of general jurisdiction. Applying the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Valores Mundiales, S.L. v. Venezuela, Judge Moss considered whether the tribunals’ jurisdictional determinations had been fully and fairly litigated and finally decided, whether the awards were authentic, and whether they remained binding within the ICSID system. The awards satisfied that deferential standard. (Memorandum Opinion, pp. 14–15.) Spain argued that the tribunals had manifestly exceeded their authority and infringed the competence of EU institutions over intra-EU disputes and State aid. It relied on Blinder, Robinson & Co. v. SEC to seek an exception to the full-faith-and-credit obligation. The Court declined to extend that narrowly framed exception to permit a collateral attack on these ICSID awards. Spain clarified that it was not asking the Court to relitigate the tribunals’ jurisdictional determinations. Judge Moss accordingly found no need to decide whether the tribunals had in fact intruded upon EU institutional competences. This was a ruling about the permissible scope of review in U.S. enforcement proceedings, not a decision invalidating EU law. (Memorandum Opinion, pp. 15–20.) 2.3 International comity and foreign sovereign compulsion Spain submitted that compliance with the awards could place it in breach of EU State aid law and urged the Court to refuse enforcement on grounds of international comity and the foreign sovereign compulsion doctrine. Judge